Category: Uncategorized

Bombardier – v – President Donald J Trump

On the 7 September 2026, President Donald Trump stated in a post on Truth Social:

 “NO MORE SELLING BOMBARDIER IN THE UNITED STATES!”

The statement followed President Trump’s threat to prevent Bombardier Inc., a Canadian aircraft manufacturer, from selling its aircraft in the United States and if the company wanted to access the United States market, “they must build here”. These remarks coincided with the more general decline in trade relations between the United States and Canada, following the recent collapse of trade negotiations between the two nations on the 21st of August 2026, where Canada imposed retaliatory tariffs on about $20 billion worth of US goods.[1]

According to Reuters, the US market is especially crucial for Bombardier Inc., as it accounts for approximately half of its manufacturer’s sales[2] and subsequent to President Trump’s remarks, Bombardier’s share price dropped by 6.4 per cent[3]. Bombardier has responded by stressing on the extent to which its existing supply chain and activities are already embedded in the United States. This Canadian company has stated that it employs around 3,500 people directly in the United States and works with approximately 2,800 United States suppliers across 47 states and therefore spending more than US$2.5 billion per year with American suppliers.[4] Additionally, Bombardier Inc. has expressed that its American presence extends further than just sales and servicing: flight-control components are manufactured in California, whilst business jets’ wings in Texas[5]. Bombardier Inc.’s response therefore highlights an important aspect of modern cross-border manufacturing; determining the location where a product is fabricated is not always straightforward. This applies even more for aircraft as the amount of work that has to be done is immense: final assembly may be done in one country while engineering, labour and other services may be originally conducted in another country.

On top of this, on the 9 September 2026, Bombardier Inc. had also indicated that it is continuing to expand its United States workforce and shall recruit around 500 positions, scheduled to open in November.[6] The political implications of this footprint quickly became apparent. Republican senators from Kansas, where Bombardier has a substantial presence, raised concerns about protecting US jobs following Trump’s announcement.[7]

So the question, my aviation clients and friends, which arises is whether President Trump can simply prohibit Bombardier Inc.’s sales?

A presidential statement does not, by itself, naturally create an enforceable prohibition on the sale or importation of Bombardier Inc. aircraft. As at now, 18 September, Bombardier Inc. aircraft can still be delivered to American customers, according to Reuters. A White House official has, however, said that the administration is preparing options and actions concerning the company.[8] Any formal restriction would therefore require an identifiable legal mechanism.

US presidents possess significant authority over international trade, but that authority generally derives from powers delegated by Congress. The precise statutory basis selected by the administration would consequently be central to determining the scope and the legality of any type of restriction regarding Bombardier Inc. business in the United States. Several existing trade statutes potentially provide mechanisms for restricting imports, although each comes with substantive and procedural requirements. For instance, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (US Law)[9] empowers Office of the United States Trade Representative to investigate and retaliate against unfair foreign trade practices. However, whether this mechanism could adequately support measures aimed at Bombardier Inc. would depend upon the administration’s stated justification, the findings made and the procedures followed.

Accordingly, should the administration officially prevent Bombardier Inc. imports, attention will surely turn to what action is taken, as well as the legislative authority and whether its statutory conditions have been satisfied. If ever, there is a loophole in the decision, it might cause more harm than good to the United States as this dispute will discourage other high net worth international companies and organisations to invest in America. For instance, Bombardier Inc. is Canadian, but its aircraft are supported by a substantial American industrial ecosystem. Restricting the company’s access to the United States market could therefore affect not only Bombardier and Canadian manufacturing, but also American suppliers, employees, maintenance facilities and customers, which may, in turn be consequential for American purchasers. Analysts have warned that the business-jet market remains tight and that restricting Bombardier aircraft could disrupt American customers already facing lengthy waiting periods for new aircraft[10].

In my view as a result, the Bombardier debate may become more about the future of global manufacturing than it is about a single Canadian aircraft manufacturer.

On one hand, more and more governments want the strategic capabilities, investment and employment related to industry to stay inside their borders, on the other hand, companies rely on global supply networks and access to outside markets. Bombardier is situated right where the opposing forces converge. Whether the next stage of the United States trade policy will favour global integration or increasingly require businesses to select where they belong could be determined by how this disputed will be handled.

© Lawrence Power 2026

Whitestone Aviation Law

[1] Associated Press (2026), “Trump threatens Canada jetmaker Bombardier, which has an extensive US footprint”, 8 September 2026. Available at https://apnews.com/article/trump-canada-carney-trade-bombardier-aircraft-e65b6eeaaa7ffbd06a67a57fb474b2e9.

[2] Reuters (2026), “Bombardier says it wants to fill 500 open US jobs despite Trump’s threats”, 9 September 2026. Available at https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/bombardier-still-recruiting-fill-500-open-us-positions-despite-trump-threats-2026-09-09/.

[3] MarketScreener (2026), “Bombardier shares fall after Trump threatens US market access”, 08 September 2026. Available at https://www.marketscreener.com/news/bombardier-shares-fall-after-trump-threatens-us-market-access-ce785bd8df8af320.

[4] Sophia Compton, Fox Business (2026), “Trump targets Bombardier, says Canadian jetmaker ‘must build’ in the US, 7 September 2026. Available at https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/trump-targets-bombardier-says-canadian-jetmaker-must-build-us.

[5] Andy Hirschfeld, Al Jazeera (2026), “Bombardier defends US manufacturing amid Trump’s aviation sales threat”, 8 September 2026. Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/9/8/bombardier-defends-us-manufacturing-amid-trumps-aviation-sales-threat.

[6] Reuters (2026), “Bombardier says it wants to fill 500 open US jobs despite Trump’s threats”, 9 September 2026. Available at https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/bombardier-still-recruiting-fill-500-open-us-positions-despite-trump-threats-2026-09-09/.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Trade Act 1974.

[10] The Canadian Press (2026), “A U.S. ban on Bombardier sales could ‘massively’ disrupt American aerospace” 8 September 2026. Available at https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/article/a-us-ban-on-bombardier-sales-could-massively-disrupt-american-aerospace-analyst/.

First Remotely Piloted Aircraft Tested Under FAA’s eIPP

On 31 August 2026, the US Federal Aviation Administration, (“FAA”), announced the first successful flight of a remotely piloted hybrid-electric aircraft under its eVTOL Integration Pilot Program (“eIPP”).

The demonstration was conducted by Elroy Air along with the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, (“LDTD”), to test cargo deliveries at Houma-Terrebonne Airport, (HUM), in Louisiana. LDTD’s was one of the 8 projects selected across 26 states by the U.S. Department of Transportation in March 2026 to participate in eIPP. Others include the Florida Department of Transportation, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, etc.

The eIPP is a program introduced by the FAA under President Trump’s Unleashing American Drone Dominance Executive Order to safely integrate Advanced Air Mobility, (“AAM”), vehicles – like remotely controlled cargo aircraft – in the US National Airspace System. The information obtained from the demonstrations, which are planned throughout the rest of the year, will be used by the FAA to identify gaps and improve relevant procedures. The projects under eIPP, amongst  other things, focuses on novel means of cargo transportation, automation technology, and air taxis.

For the demonstration, Elroy Air used its Chaparral aircraft, which is a hybrid-electric vTOL, (vertical takeoff and landing), system. Chaparral is designed to carry heavy cargo – more than 500 pounds – between non-traditional sites, such as offshore energy platforms, disaster response, and isolated communities.

Hybrid-electric aviation, which can combine other energy sources with electric propulsion, is becoming more attractive as opposed to conventional aircraft since it facilitates reduced fuel consumption, emissions, etc. (read our article on Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) as an energy source here[1]). Additionally, remotely controlled aircraft open up routes for cargo transportation which are either veritably expensive and inefficient for conventional crewed operations or extremely difficult. Since there are no passengers onboard, such remotely piloted aircraft can be optimised for efficient cargo transportation without incurring design and operational costs associated with conventional manned aircraft.

However, prior to complete integration of remotely controlled aviation in the National Airspace System, regulators and operators must ensure that the systems meet the safety standards applied to conventional aircraft. Automated aviation poses certain unique challenges which must be adequately addressed, such as effective communication between the aircraft and on-ground pilots and handling unexpected situations. For commercial cargo aircraft to safely share airspace with passenger planes, helicopters, and other aircraft, reliable navigation, surveillance and control systems are essential.

© Lawrence Power 2026

Whitestone Aviation Law

Sources:

[1] FAA Announced First Remotely Piloted Hybrid-Electric Cargo Flight (1 September 2026, Aerospace Global News) https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/news/faa-first-hybrid-electric-unmanned-cargo-flights/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=rasa_io&utm_campaign=newsletter

[2] The eIPP: What You Need to Know (Federal Aviation Administration) https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/eIPP-Announcement-Fact-Sheet.pdf

[3] FAA Announces Key Demonstrations with the First Remotely-Piloted Hybrid-Electric Flight for Cargo Shipment (31 August 2026, Federal Aviation Administration) https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-announces-key-demonstrations-first-remotely-piloted-hybrid-electric-flight-cargo

[4] FAA Announces Test Flight with Remotely-Piloted Hybrid-Electric Cargo Aircraft (1 September 2026, Unmanned Airspace) https://www.unmannedairspace.info/uncategorized/faa-announces-test-flight-with-remotely-piloted-hybrid-electric-cargo-flight/

[5] Pilotless Cargo Aircraft Could Change How Packages Move (7 September 2026, Fox News) https://www.foxnews.com/tech/pilotless-cargo-aircraft-could-change-how-packages-move

[6] Elroy Air Completes The First Uncrewed Autonomous Flights Under U.S. DOT and FAA’s eVTOL Integration Pilot Program (eIPP) (2 September 2026, Elroy Air Press Release) <https://elroyair.com/company/news/press-releases/elroy-air-completes-first-autonomous-and-uncrewed-flights-under-eIPP/>

[1] https://whitestonechambers.com/articles/u-s-likely-to-miss-2030-saf-target-wsu-study-finds/

Real or Really Close? The EU’s New AI Labeling Regime and the Risk of Realistic Deepfakes

What does it mean when a politician’s gaffe is exposed as a fabrication? How is a consumer to trust a commending product review when its penmanship originates from the oft imperceptible hand of an algorithm? In a bid to answer these questions, the European Union has enacted a set of transparency rules under its landmark AI Act, compelling companies to label artificially generated or manipulated content designed to look authentic. Starting from this month, the age of the invisible deepfake is, in principle, over.

The initiative comes as a direct response to the flood of deceptive content that has plagued the information ecosystem in recent years: from fabricated audio of Slovakian opposition leaders conspiring to rig elections to videos of Emmanuel Macron in a 1980s nightclub. The new rules, which came into force on the 2 August 2026, mandate that providers of interactive AI systems such as chatbots ensure users are aware that they are not communicating with a human. More significantly, deployers, (the publishers and companies using AI), must clearly label deepfakes and AI-generated text on matters of public interest if it has not undergone substantive human editorial oversight; this includes politics, public health or the environment. This is an attempt to preserve the integrity of democratic discourse through preventing the manipulation of facts.

I can report that the EU legal framework is more intricate than first appears. The laws create a layered set of obligations that apply not only to high-risk AI systems, but more broadly to any system that interacts with people or generates content. For example, Article 50 requires providers of generative AI systems to embed digital watermarks in their outputs to ensure they are technically detectable as AI-generated. Providers of systems already on the market are given a grace period until the 2 December 2026 to comply with this technical and logistical challenge. The onus falls on the deployer under Article 50, whereby they must ensure this mark translates into a clear and perceivable label for the user- a label which cannot be hidden in a website’s terms and conditions.

While the intent to empower consumers is commendable, the rules have sparked controversies within the tech industry. The most prominent concern, as voiced by the Computer and Communications Industry Association, (CCIA), is that the European Commission’s implementing guidelines have expanded the definition of a deepfake far beyond what was originally envisioned. The concern is that the requirement to label is so broad that it will capture almost everything, turning a benign AI-generated landscape in an advert into the equivalent of a malignant, manipulated political speech. Boniface de Champris, the CCIA’s Ai policy lead, warns that this risks creating a situation similar to that of cookie banners, that once labels are everywhere then users will simply stop noticing them. This undermines the very goal of transparency. Additionally, this fear of legal fatigue is accompanied by the complexity of the definitions and what content requires a label. For businesses, it is my opinion that the question becomes a legal minefield. Where is the line between standard AI-assisted editing, such as color correction or background removal, which is exempt from labeling and a substantive manipulation that requires prominent disclosure? This legal uncertainty creates a risk of ‘over-compliance’, as companies fearing the up to €15 million fines, may label content indiscriminately. The rules offer exemption for creative, satirical and fictional  works, a distinction that is crucial yet inherently subjective for businesses to interpret.

So, does, in fact, the EU’s new AI transparency regime signal the rise of a new era of digital accountability, where citizens and consumers alike are armed with the information they need to navigate an increasingly synthetic online world? Will it prove to be well-intentioned, or will it be an ultimately counterproductive measure, drowning the public in a sea of labels and stifling innovation with a one-size-fits-all requirement? Those two things can be simultaneously true at once. The success of this landmark legislation will be determined not simply by its implementation in the coming months, but by whether its labels serve to illuminate the truth or simply become more digital noise.

© Lawrence Power 2026

Whitestone Law

References:

Gates, T. (2026, August 04). Always Read the Label: EU AI Transparency Rules and Questions That Remain Unanswered. Accessible at:

https://www.reedsmith.com/our-insights/blogs/viewpoints/102nfqg/always-read-the-label-eu-ai-transparency-rules-and-questions-that-remain-unanswe

Hamit, D. (2026, August 03). EU rules requiring labels on AI-generated content take effect. Anadolu Ajansi. Accessible at:

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-rules-requiring-labels-on-ai-generated-content-take-effect/4017004

Machin, E. (2026, August 03). You Talkin’ To Me? Operationalising The EU AI Act’s Transparency Obligations. Ropes Gray. Accessible at:

https://www.ropesgray.com/en/insights/viewpoints/2026/08/102nfqm/you-talkin-to-me-operationalising-the-eu-ai-acts-transparency-obligations

Rankin, J. (2026, July 31). AI labels to be compulsory on authentic-looking content under EU rules. The Guardian. Accessible at:

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/jul/31/ai-labels-to-be-compulsory-on-authentic-looking-content-under-eu-rules

WAM (2026, August 03). EU enforced mandatory labelling of AI-generated content. Gulf News. Accessible at:

https://gulfnews.com/business/retail/eu-enforces-mandatory-labelling-of-ai-generated-content-1.500628946

(2026, 14 May). The EU AI Act’s Transparency Rules: A Practical Guide to Article 50. Accessible at: https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/transparency-rules-article-50/

(2026, 31 July). Code of Practice on Transparency of AI-generated Content. Europa. Accessible at:

https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-ai-generated-content

Can’t Stand The Heat

Recent research suggests that global warming is not merely continuing, but accelerating. I have been writing about this for 2 years now when it became clear to me, we would never meet the Paris targets. Sorry in advance but warming is now baked in.

A study reported in Geophysical Research Letters estimates that since 2015 the Earth has warmed at approximately 0.35°C per decade, compared with just under 0.2°C per decade between 1970 and 2015. After filtering out natural influences including El Niño, volcanic activity and solar variation, researchers identified a near doubling of the underlying warming rate. If that pace continues, they warn that the long-term 1.5°C threshold associated with the Paris Agreement could be exceeded before 2030. In my opinion this is certain.

The legal significance of that finding extends beyond the scientific debate. Article 2 of the Paris Agreement aims to hold the increase in global average temperature to “well below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels while pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. Article 4 requires States to prepare and maintain successive nationally determined contributions (“NDCs”), with each successive contribution representing a progression and reflecting that State’s highest possible ambition.

Crossing 1.5°C would not, however, operate like breaching a straightforward statutory limit. The Paris framework combines a collective global temperature objective with obligations concerning the measures individual States take. The legal issue is therefore not simply whether global temperatures pass 1.5°C, but whether governments are taking sufficiently ambitious action in accordance with their international and domestic obligations.

That distinction is becoming increasingly important as finally climate obligations move from diplomacy into the courts. In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights held in 2024 that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights encompasses a right to effective protection by State authorities against the serious adverse effects of climate change. The Court found that Switzerland had failed to comply with its positive obligations, identifying critical gaps in its domestic regulatory framework and failures to implement appropriate mitigation measures in time.

The international legal landscape developed further in July 2025 when the International Court of Justice delivered its Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change. Although ICJ advisory opinions do not have binding force in the same way as judgments in contentious cases, the Court itself recognises that they carry significant legal weight and authority.

For the United Kingdom, these international developments sit alongside binding domestic climate legislation. Section 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for 2050 is at least 100% below the 1990 baseline, creating the statutory net-zero target alongside the Act’s carbon-budget framework. This has not been amended which explains the government’s position in the North Sea.

Now the latest warming data may have consequences extending well beyond environmental policy. Stronger evidence that warming is accelerating could become increasingly relevant when courts assess government mitigation strategies, emissions targets and compliance with existing legal duties. It may also strengthen the evidential basis of future climate litigation where claimants argue that governments have failed to translate long-term commitments into sufficiently timely action.

The science does not itself determine legal liability. However, as the distance between international climate targets and the planet’s actual warming trajectory narrows, the legal question is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid: what are Countries required to do when the evidence shows that their existing action is simply not good enough?

© Lawrence Power 2026

Beyond Mazur: Rights of Audience and the Continuing Problem of Unqualified Advocacy.

Whitestone Chambers’ Mina Heung, acting for British Airways Plc in Poulten & Others v British Airways Plc, 20 July 2026, successfully challenged the right of audience of an advocacy agent appearing in a small claims flight compensation case before District Judge Atkin at Uxbridge County Court.

The Court held that the advocate had not established a legal entitlement to appear. It also found that the challenge had been properly raised and awarded British Airways its costs arising out of the adjournment and determination of the preliminary issue.

The ruling provides a timely reminder that recent clarification of the law concerning the conduct of litigation has not resolved the separate and increasingly contentious question of who is entitled to conduct advocacy in the County Court.

The position after Mazur.

In Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2026] EWCA Civ 369, the Court of Appeal addressed the reserved legal activity of conducting litigation. It held that an unauthorised person may lawfully perform litigation tasks for and on behalf of an authorised individual, provided that the authorised individual retains responsibility and appropriate arrangements exist for management, supervision and control.

Mazur was an important decision, but it did not determine the separate question of rights of audience.

The Legal Services Act 2007 identifies the conduct of litigation and the exercise of a right of audience as distinct reserved legal activities. Authority to undertake litigation work under supervision does not therefore answer whether an individual is legally entitled to address the Court as an advocate.

That distinction was central to the issue before District Judge Atkin.

The representation structure.

The underlying claim concerned UK 261 statutory compensation following the cancellation of a flight.

The passengers had instructed a firm of solicitors to conduct their claim. That firm instructed a separate advocacy provider, which in turn instructed the individual who attended the hearing.

The structure was therefore:

Passengers → solicitors on the court record → advocacy provider → individual advocate

The individual did not possess an independent right of audience. His entitlement to conduct the hearing therefore depended upon establishing that he fell within an applicable exception.

The Court considered two possible routes: Practice Direction 27A and the exempt-person provisions within Schedule 3 to the Legal Services Act 2007.

Practice Direction 27A.

Practice Direction 27A defines a “lawyer”, for the purposes of representation on the small claims track, as including a barrister, solicitor or a legal executive “employed by a solicitor”, together with those otherwise authorised to act as litigators or advocates.

The advocate was described as having been “engaged” by the advocacy provider. The Court rejected the submission that the words “employed by a solicitor” should be interpreted as extending to any individual subcontracted or commercially engaged by a legal services business.

District Judge Atkin concluded that, had the provision been intended to encompass any person retained through such an arrangement, it could have been expressed in those broader terms.

The Practice Direction did not provide a general route by which an external advocacy agent could acquire a right of audience.

The limits of Halborg.

The alternative argument relied upon Schedule 3 paragraph 1(7) of the Legal Services Act 2007 and the decision in Halborg v Apple (UK) Ltd & Another [2022] (Unreported).
Halborg has frequently been relied upon for the proposition that advocacy may amount to “assisting in the conduct of litigation”. It is, however, a persuasive County Court decision rather than binding appellate authority, and it arose from a particular factual and professional structure.

In Halborg, the firm responsible for instructing and supervising the advocate was also, through its trading style, providing the litigation services in the proceedings. The Court’s conclusions were reached in the context of that integrated arrangement.

The structure before District Judge Atkin was materially different. The solicitors conducting the claim and the separate advocacy provider were distinct entities, with the individual advocate appearing at the end of a further chain of instruction.

The Court was not satisfied that the statutory conditions had been established merely by relying upon Halborg and asserting that the advocate was supervised.
Halborg did not confer an automatic right of audience. It did not operate as a gateway through which every individual instructed by an advocacy provider could pass.

A closer comparison: Vehicle Control Services v Langley.

The Defendant relied upon Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Langley [2026] EWCC 1 as a closer factual comparison.

Langley also concerned a layered structure in which the solicitors conducting the litigation instructed a separate advocacy provider, which then subcontracted an individual to attend the hearing.

DJ Pratt distinguished that arrangement from the traditional model of a managing clerk or legal executive genuinely working under the direction of the solicitor conducting the litigation. The Court held that advocacy alone could not make the exemption self-proving and that supervision by an advocacy agency which had taken no part in the litigation did not necessarily satisfy the statutory conditions.

District Judge Atkin considered the structure in Langley to be more closely analogous to the case before her.

The Court accepted that advocacy might, in an appropriate case, form part of assisting in the conduct of litigation. The difficulty was that the existence of advocacy could not, by itself, establish all the remaining elements of the statutory exemption.

The decision.

District Judge Atkin found that the right-of-audience challenge had been correctly raised.

The Court was not satisfied that the advocate fell within the relevant definition under Practice Direction 27A. Nor was it satisfied that the requirements of Schedule 3 paragraph 1(7) had been established.

The Judge emphasised that the responsibility rests upon the person seeking to exercise a right of audience. An individual without independent advocacy rights must attend court and be able to establish the legal basis upon which they seek to appear.

The ruling was expressly fact-specific. It did not establish that no advocacy agent could ever fall within the statutory exemption. It established that the exemption cannot be presumed merely because an individual has been instructed by a solicitor or through an advocacy provider.

The Defendant was awarded its costs arising from the adjournment and of the preliminary issue.

Why the issue matters.

Rights of audience are not just a procedural formality.

An advocate appearing before the Court undertakes professional responsibilities to the Court, the client and the administration of justice. Barristers, solicitors and independently authorised advocates are subject to regulatory standards, professional discipline and insurance requirements.

The same entitlement cannot be created simply by applying a professional-sounding label or inserting a regulated firm somewhere within a chain of commercial instruction.

The point is particularly important in high-volume small claims litigation. A claimant may have instructed one business, while the individual ultimately conducting the hearing has been retained through several further layers and may have had no direct contact with the claimant.

The claimant nevertheless remains the party to the proceedings and may bear the consequences of the way the case is presented, including an adverse costs order.

Clarity about who is entitled to appear therefore protects not only the Court and the opposing party, but the litigant whose case is being conducted.

The need for authoritative guidance.

Mazur has now provided authoritative clarification concerning the delegation and supervision of litigation work. It should not, however, be treated as resolving the separate law governing advocacy.

The continuing divergence between County Court decisions such as Halborg and Langley demonstrates the need for binding appellate guidance on the application of Schedule 3 to modern advocacy-agency arrangements.

Until that guidance is available, courts are likely to continue examining these arrangements on their individual facts.

The central principle remains straightforward.

An individual without an independent right of audience does not acquire one merely because they have been instructed through solicitors or an advocacy provider.


Halborg is not a gateway. Rights of audience must be established, not assumed.

This article is based upon counsel’s contemporaneous note of an ex tempore judgment. An approved transcript is awaited.

© Mina Heung 2026

Gulfstream G700’s 100 Speed Records: Why This Matters Beyond Speed Records

Whitestone Chambers friends at Gulfstream Aerospace recently announced that its G700 business jet had achieved both its 100th customer delivery and its 100th city-pair speed record, the headlines naturally focused on speed. The G700’s 100th record was set on a flight from Georgia to California, completed in just 4 hours and 36 minutes at an average cruise speed of Mach 0.91. Shortly afterwards, the same aircraft set another record flying from California to New Jersey. For context, Mach 0.91 is significantly faster than the cruising speed of most commercial airliners, placing the G700 among the fastest civilian aircraft currently in regular operation.

Yet the most interesting part of the story is not the speed record itself. Impressive as those numbers are, speed records are ultimately a marketing tool. They demonstrate performance, generate headlines, and help manufacturers distinguish their aircraft in a highly competitive market. The more revealing figure in Gulfstream’s announcement is arguably not 100 speed records, but 100 deliveries.

The G700 only entered service after receiving certification from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in March 2024. Since then, Gulfstream has delivered 100 aircrafts, secured approvals in over 20 countries, and seen more than 700 pilots obtain type ratings for the aircraft. For a highly sophisticated aircraft costing tens of millions of dollars, that is a remarkable pace of adoption.

What makes this significant is the amount of work that takes place behind the scenes before an aircraft can reach that point. When a new aircraft enters service, manufacturers are not simply selling a product. They are introducing an entirely new aircraft type into a highly regulated global system. Regulators must be satisfied that the aircraft is safe. Pilots must undergo specialised training. Maintenance programmes must be developed and approved. Operators must update procedures and manuals. Insurers have to assess risk. National aviation authorities must determine whether they will recognise or validate the original certification.

By the time the 100th G700 was delivered, an enormous amount of regulatory coordination had already taken place. Modern aviation law depends on a level of international cooperation such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) who define the standards and recommended practices that govern aviation safety, security, efficiency and environmental protection across 193 member states. Imagine if every country required Gulfstream to repeat the entire certification process from the beginning before permitting the G700 to operate within its airspace. Aircraft manufacturers would face years of additional testing, operators would encounter significant delays, and international aviation would become vastly more expensive and inefficient.

Instead, aviation regulators operate within a framework built on cooperation and mutual confidence. When a trusted authority such as the FAA certifies an aircraft, other regulators frequently rely upon that work when considering their own approvals. While additional reviews may still be required, the system avoids unnecessary duplication while maintaining safety oversight.

The G700’s rapid acceptance across multiple jurisdictions is therefore not simply a commercial success story. It is also evidence that this international regulatory framework continues to function effectively in an era of increasingly advanced aircraft. The aircraft also highlights a broader trend in aviation regulation. Modern business jets are becoming more technologically sophisticated, and as aircraft evolve, regulators face the challenge of ensuring safety without stifling innovation.

Aviation regulation has gradually shifted from a prescriptive regulatory framework to a performance-based approach, with regulators increasingly focusing on whether manufacturers can demonstrate that an aircraft achieves the required level of safety. Rather than prescribing a single design solution, they ask manufacturers to demonstrate that the aircraft meets the required level of safety. The G700 is an example of how that approach works in practice. Its certification demonstrates that existing regulatory frameworks are capable of accommodating new technologies while preserving the high safety standards upon which aviation depends.

Looking ahead, the most significant legal debates surrounding aircraft such as the G700 may centre on environmental regulation. Critics argue that private jets generate disproportionately high emissions per passenger, making them an increasingly visible target in discussions about climate policy. Supporters, meanwhile, point to the economic value they create by facilitating investment, international business activity, and connectivity to locations that may not be well served by scheduled airline services.

The G700 sits squarely within this debate. On the one hand, it represents technological progress. Compared to many older business jets, it is more fuel-efficient, incorporates modern engine technology, and is capable of flying longer distances with greater efficiency. If operators replace older aircraft with newer models such as the G700, emissions can be reduced on a per-flight basis. However, critics question whether efficiency improvements alone are enough. If the broader policy objective is to reduce aviation’s environmental footprint, the debate shifts from how aircraft are operated to whether certain types of flying should be encouraged at all. In that sense, the discussion becomes less about technology and more about public policy.

This presents regulators with a difficult challenge. Should aviation law focus on accelerating fleet modernisation and encouraging the adoption of cleaner aircraft? Or should it impose measures designed to discourage certain categories of air travel altogether?

The answer is likely to influence a wide range of regulatory developments, including sustainable aviation fuel mandates, emissions trading schemes, carbon taxation, environmental reporting requirements, etc. As environmental regulation becomes a larger part of aviation law, the legal questions surrounding aircraft such as the G700 may ultimately have to do with how society chooses to balance innovation, economic activity, and climate objectives.

Viewed in that context, Gulfstream’s latest announcement highlights the commercial success of one of the world’s most advanced business jets, but also offers a glimpse into the legal, regulatory, and environmental challenges that are likely to shape the next chapter of aviation. Modern aviation may no longer be defined solely by technological capability, but by how that capability fits within an increasingly complex regulatory landscape.

© Whitestone Chambers 2026

Sources:

Ground Breaking Legal Reform

Baroness Carr, the Lady Chief Justice of England and Wales, has recently announced significant reforms to the structure of the High Court. From October of this year, the Chancery Division – the court that typically deals with commercial work – will be replaced by a new Business and Property Division, bringing many of the courts responsible for commercial and business disputes under one “roof”.

Out with the old…

The reform marks a bittersweet end to my beloved Chancery Division. It’s where as a young barrister I wanted to practice and I have been lucky enough to do so my entire career. The Chancery Division’s long history: with its early roots dating back to the Court of Chancery of the fourteenth century and the King’s Chancery several centuries earlier: make it one of the oldest institutions in the English legal system.

Critics of the previous structure have long argued that the division of commercial work between the Chancery Division and the King’s Bench Division was increasingly artificial. Despite handling similar types of high-value business disputes, courts such as the Commercial Court and Technology and Construction Court remained administratively separate from the Business and Property Courts. This may not accurately reflect the requirements of modern litigation – where disputes often span multiple areas of law and require specialist expertise drawn from different jurisdictions.

“Some might say that our three existing High Court Divisions no longer represent the work we actually do… Perhaps we should think about whether judicial leadership and the High Court Divisions should not more accurately reflect the types of work that are actually being done by our courts in 2025.” (Baroness Carr, Dec 2025)

…In with the new?

Under the new structure my former mini pupil master, Sir Colin Birss, currently Chancellor of the High Court, will become President of the Business and Property Division – headquartered in the Rolls Building in London, and continuing to operate from regional centres in Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, and Newcastle. 

In addition to the specialist courts already administered within the Chancery Division, he will assume responsibility for three courts that have historically sat within the King’s Bench Division: the Commercial Court, the Technology and Construction Court and the Admiralty Court. These courts will join the existing Business and Property Courts jurisdictions, including the Business List, Financial List, Competition List, Insolvency and Companies List, Intellectual Property List, Property, Trusts and Probate List and Revenue List.

Bringing these specialist jurisdictions together under a single division is intended to improve efficiency and make judicial deployment more flexible, enabling cases to be assigned more easily to judges with the most appropriate expertise. Such a single division had been proposed at the time of the CPR being developed in 1998 but was not followed through.

The government has welcomed the changes. In a statement to Parliament, Justice Secretary David Lammy said the reform would strengthen the international profile of the courts, improve accessibility for domestic and overseas users and provide a clearer system of judicial governance through a single point of leadership. The planned reforms come against the backdrop of a wider push by the judiciary for greater transparency in England’s courts, priorities set out by Carr.

The changes will be implemented through an Order in Council, accompanied by amendments to the Civil Procedure Rules and related practice directions.

Ch.D it’s been memorable.

© Lawrence Power 2026

Sources

Reforms set out: https://www.judiciary.uk/the-lady-chief-justice-and-lord-chancellor-modernise-the-high-court-through-establishment-of-the-business-and-property-division/

History of the Chancery Division: https://rozenberg.substack.com/p/new-high-court-structure

Lecture by Baroness Carr: https://www.judiciary.uk/lecture-by-the-lady-chief-justice-the-constitutional-reform-act-20-years-on/

Wider push for transparency: https://www.ft.com/content/029feacc-6c07-4031-b077-5f114e91f011?countryCode=GBR&multistepRegForm=multistep&syn-25a6b1a6=1

U.S LIKELY TO MISS 2030 SAF TARGET – WSU STUDY FINDS

A study by Washington State University, (“WSU”), has found that the US is unlikely to realise its 2030 target for Sustainable Aviation Fuel, (“SAF”). Even under an optimistic assessment, the US is likely to produce 2.1 billion gallons of SAF, which falls short of the federal goal of 3 billion gallons per year by 2030. The domestic production is expanding, but will nevertheless be insufficient to meet the target without additional support and investment.

SAF facilitates the reduction of carbon emissions in the aviation industry. Although planes using SAF will burn an equivalent amount of carbon dioxide compared to those using normal jet fuel, the net carbon emission is lower in the former by virtue of SAF’s production process. Depending on the method of production, SAF has the capacity to reduce lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions by around 80 per cent. The most prominent form of SAF, as per the study, is Hydroprocessed Esters and Fatty Acids (“HEFA”), which are produced from oils and greases, such as cooking oil.

Unlike cars, which can be electrified, long-haul commercial flights cannot adopt such technology due to additional costs and/or technological incapacity. SAF is currently the most suitable means to reduce emissions since it requires minimal additional infrastructure. SAF can be blended with normal jet fuel.

The WSU-led study reviewed the relevant publicly announced projects in the US. One of the primary hurdles highlighted by the study is the non-implementation of projects; projects are announced, but not always carried out. To this effect, the study discusses the ‘implementation ratio’ to evaluate the ratio of projects which are announced versus those that are actually realised. Only about half of the announcements have led to operational facilities until now.

There are various reasons behind this announcement and implementation gap. One reason is the shortage of raw material to produce HEFA, i.e. used cooking oil. The demand for cooking oil has surpassed the present supply. A second connected reason is the commercial viability of SAF. Even if cooking oil is available to produce SAF, it might be more economical and commercially attractive for producers to use it to produce renewable diesel for cars, which is more profitable in light of the US policies and the current market given the Middle East conflict.

In the UK, the SAF target was missed in 2025. The mandatory target was for SAF to account for 2 per cent of the aviation fuel supply, but only 1.6 per cent was actually SAF. Although these figures are provisional, as per the Department for Transport. The target is 10 per cent by 2030 which now looks highly optimistic unless government action is taken.

© Lawrence Power 2026

Sources:

[1] Study Finds SAF Could Fall Short of 2030 Target (26 May 2026, AVWeb) <https://avweb.com/ownership/fuel-news/study-finds-saf-short-of-targets/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=rasa_io&utm_campaign=newsletter>

[2] What’s the Future of Sustainable Aviation Fuel? Here’s a Realistic Look… (27 May 2026, Michigan Farm News) <https://www.michiganfarmnews.com/what-s-the-future-of-sustainable-aviation-fuel-here-s-a-realistic-look->

[3] Sustainable Aviation Fuel Likely to Miss 2030 US Target (27 May 2026, Earth.com) <https://www.earth.com/news/sustainable-aviation-fuel-likely-to-miss-2030-u-s-target/>

[4] WSU Study Offers Realistic Look at the Future of Sustainable Aviation Fuel (26 May 2026, WSU Insider) <https://news.wsu.edu/press-release/2026/05/26/wsu-study-offers-realistic-look-at-the-future-of-sustainable-aviation-fuel/>

[5] Sustainable Aviation Fuel Take-up in UK Unlikely to Hit 2025 Target, Data Suggests (26 December 2025, The Guardian) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/dec/26/sustainable-aviation-fuel-mandate-uk-government-data-2025?CMP=share_btn_url>

[6] Pragmatic Assessment of Meeting the 2030 US Sustainable Aviation Fuel Goal (Biomass and Bioenergy 2026) <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2025.108516>

The Rising Cost of Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has transformed the technology sector at a remarkable speed over the past few years. What once appeared to be an experimental innovation, has quickly evolved into a mainstream tool used across almost every part of society.

From students and freelancers to professional services firms, AI has become embedded in everyday workflows, often faster than the broader public debate about its long-term consequences has been able to keep pace.

The appeal of AI is obvious. With tools like ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, GitHub Copilot and many more such tools, tasks that would once have required hours of human effort can now be completed in seconds and minutes. AI systems are remarkably efficient at drafting documents, creating presentations, analysing data and automating tedious administrative tasks. Although this has driven lower operational costs and higher productivity for organisations, this quick uptake of AI has also raised serious concerns. More and more people are finding themselves without employment.[i] Why? Because organisations may view the use of AI as cheaper than paying the full salary of an individual, or so it seemed at first.

Over the past few months, AI businesses have been providing consumers with access to increasingly powerful AI tools at remarkably low costs. Advanced services have been made available to users for as little as $20 a month.[ii] These premium tools now do far more than generate basic text responses. With the help of AI agents that can perform complicated and time-consuming tasks, the advanced versions can now create apps from prompts, edit and design websites, automate workflows and even generate high-resolution images.

However, the period of cheap, flat-rate AI subscriptions may not be sustainable according to the recent developments.[iii] As reported by PCWorld, Microsoft-owned GitHub appears to be one of the first major AI providers to publicly abandon flat-rate subscription models. In response to growing concerns about the true cost of advanced AI services, the company is reportedly moving its Copilot AI offerings toward more costly usage-based pricing structures.[iv] The main issue is that large amounts of processing power are required for more powerful and sophisticated AI systems. Traditional AI chat features are relatively modest in comparison with the capabilities now being offered by newer tools. These systems are no longer limited to producing basic text outputs or responding to prompts; they are increasingly capable of generating software, carrying out multi-steps tasks, providing accurate advice and editing documents with little to no human supervision.[v] These functions have drastically raised operating costs and put significantly greater strain on the computing infrastructure. As a result, there is a gap between user expectations and economic reality when such services are offered at low fixed rates.

While AI service providers continue to bear the enormous infrastructure costs necessary to maintain those systems[vi], consumers have grown accustomed to having access to remarkably powerful AI capabilities at comparatively low prices. Anthropic, the company behind Claude AI, has mentioned that the purpose of its tools was primarily conversational and that certain newer functions were never intended to be supported by its current subscription models. It is reportedly experimenting with removing Claude Code from its Pro plan and adjusting Pro and Max users’ use limiting in an effort to discover a combination that makes those plans financially viable.

With these ongoing rises in subscription prices, it is hard to imagine that ChatGPT Plus and Pro will not eventually follow suit, even though OpenAI has so far signalled confidence in maintaining its flat-rate plans.[vii]

Ultimately, the market may be approaching a pricing correction. The true cost of advanced AI is likely to become clearer as providers seek business models that reflect the computational and infrastructure demands of these tools. What users currently access for $20 or $100 per month may, in time, cost significantly more particularly for business and enterprise users. Rather than signalling the end of AI’s appeal, this shift may simply mark the end of artificial cheap access to increasingly sophisticated technology. The magic of AI maybe fading…….

© Lawrence Power 2026

[i] Trade Arabia (2026) ‘AI “proving more expensive than human workers”, 10 May 2026. Available at https://www.tradearabia.com/News/462306/AI-‘proving-more-expensive-than-human-workers’-

[ii] Patterson B. (2026) ‘The $20 AI subscription era has become untenable’,  PCWorld 01 May 2026. Available at https://www.pcworld.com/article/3129267/the-20-ai-subscription-era-has-become-untenable.html

[iii] Patterson B (2026) ‘GitHub Copilot’s price shakeup could signal the end of cheap AI coding’, PCWorld 27 April 2026. Available at https://www.pcworld.com/article/3125621/github-copilots-price-shakeup-could-signal-the-end-of-cheap-ai-coding.html

[iv] Patterson B. (2026) ‘The $20 AI subscription era has become untenable’,  PCWorld 01 May 2026. Available at https://www.pcworld.com/article/3129267/the-20-ai-subscription-era-has-become-untenable.html

[v] The Economic Times (2026) ‘Replacing humans with AI is turning out to be costlier than expected, Uber, Nvidia execs say’, 08 May 2026. Available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/work/replacing-humans-with-ai-is-turning-out-to-be-costlier-than-expected-uber-nvidia-execs-say/articleshow/130952035.cms?from=mdr

[vi] The Guardian (2026) ‘AI costs are coming to consumers’, 05 May 2026. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/global/2026/may/04/ai-costs-are-coming-to-consumers

[vii] Patterson B. (2026) ‘The $20 AI subscription era has become untenable’,  PCWorld 01 May 2026. Available at https://www.pcworld.com/article/3129267/the-20-ai-subscription-era-has-become-untenable.html

To Practice Law – What Now is Proper Supervision?

For a brief moment, it looked as though a huge part of everyday legal practice might suddenly become unlawful. That was the unsettling effect of the initial High Court’s decision in Mazur: a judgment which, called into question whether paralegals, trainees and legal executives could continue doing the work they have always done, issuing claims, progressing cases, and handling the mechanics of litigation, even under supervision.

The Court of Appeal’s recent decision in CILEX v Mazur has now restored a measure of stability, but it does more than simply reverse the earlier ruling. It offers a clearer articulation of how the law understands the conduct of litigation, and in doing so, brings it back into alignment with the realities of modern legal practice. At the centre of the case was the meaning of “carrying on the conduct of litigation” as set out in the Legal Services Act 2007. The High Court approached that question by focusing closely on who performed particular tasks. The Court of Appeal reframed the issue. As it explained, “the words conduct of litigation refer to the tasks to be undertaken, whilst the words carry on refer to direction and control of, and responsibility for, those tasks.”

That distinction proves decisive. It shifts the emphasis away from the mechanics of legal work and towards responsibility for it. On that basis, the Court rejected the idea that unauthorised individuals are limited to a purely supportive role, holding that the distinction between assisting and conducting litigation under supervision was not correct. Instead, it confirmed that unauthorised persons may carry out tasks which fall within the conduct of litigation, provided they do so on behalf of an authorised individual who retains responsibility. In the Court’s words, “it is not unlawful for an unauthorised person to act for and on behalf of an authorised individual so as to conduct litigation under their supervision,” so long as appropriate arrangements are in place.

The significance of that conclusion lies in its recognition of how legal services are actually delivered. Delegation is not a marginal feature of practice, but a central one. The Court acknowledged this directly, describing it as “a widespread and well-regulated practice.” Across law firms, in-house teams and advice organisations, litigation is conducted through structured teams in which work is distributed across individuals with varying levels of qualification and experience. To characterise that model as unlawful would not only have been disruptive, but difficult to reconcile with the broader objectives of the statutory framework.

The decision also carries broader implications for the composition of the profession. The modern legal landscape is no longer defined solely by the traditional solicitor pathway. Alternative routes, including those offered through CILEX, have expanded access to legal careers and embedded a wider range of professionals within the delivery of legal services. Much of the work undertaken by those professionals sits precisely within the space that Mazur had rendered uncertain. By restoring the legality of supervised delegation, the Court of Appeal has, in effect, affirmed a more flexible and inclusive model of legal practice.

That said, the judgment is careful to emphasise that responsibility remains firmly anchored with the authorised individual. Delegation does not dilute accountability. The authorised person must retain control of the litigation, including responsibility to the client and to the court. Yet beyond that core principle, the Court deliberately avoided prescribing detailed rules. It acknowledged that “the degree of appropriate control and supervision will always depend on the circumstances,” and declined to produce an exhaustive list of what falls within or outside the conduct of litigation.

This leaves a degree of flexibility at the margins. In many contexts, that flexibility will be both practical and necessary. However, in areas such as insolvency, where individuals may interact with non-authorised actors at an early stage and where significant decisions can be shaped before a formally authorised practitioner assumes control, the boundaries may be less clear. The Court’s emphasis on responsibility invites closer scrutiny of how, and at what point, that responsibility is meaningfully exercised in practice.

Looking ahead, the focus is likely to shift from the scope of delegation to the quality of supervision. Regulators, including the SRA, have already indicated that further guidance will be required, and firms will need to ensure that their internal structures reflect not only formal responsibility, but effective oversight. The question is no longer whether unauthorised staff can participate in litigation, that issue has now been resolved, but whether the systems within which they operate adequately support the retention of responsibility by authorised individuals.

The importance of Court of Appeal’s ruling lies in its recognition that legal practice is inherently collaborative. One way to understand what the Court of Appeal is recognising is to picture how a typical case actually moves through a modern legal team. A client’s matter might begin with a paralegal gathering documents, corresponding with the client, and preparing the first draft of a claim. A trainee or legal executive may then refine that draft, deal with procedural steps such as issuing proceedings or managing deadlines, and maintain day-to-day conduct of the file. Throughout, a supervising solicitor reviews key decisions, signs off on critical steps, and retains overall responsibility for the strategy and outcome of the case. No single individual does everything, yet the work progresses efficiently because each person contributes within a structured framework. What matters is that the supervising lawyer remains in control, not by performing every task personally, but by directing, checking and taking responsibility for the work as a whole. It is precisely this layered, collaborative model that the High Court’s decision placed under strain, and which the Court of Appeal has now, in effect, validated as both lawful and essential to the functioning of contemporary legal practice.

Ultimately, Mazur considers what the legal profession has already become. The Court of Appeal has recognised that litigation is no longer the work of a single, identifiable lawyer, but of teams operating within layered structures of responsibility. In doing so, it has preserved a system that is more efficient, more accessible, and more reflective of modern practice. But that recognition comes with a sharper challenge. If responsibility is the thread that holds this model together, it cannot be allowed to thin out as work is passed down the chain. The decision may have restored stability for now, but it also places the profession on notice: the legitimacy of this collaborative model will depend on whether supervision is real, accountability is felt, and responsibility remains more than a name attached to a file.

© Whitestone Chambers 2026

Sources: