Author: Whitestone Chambers

U.S LIKELY TO MISS 2030 SAF TARGET – WSU STUDY FINDS

A study by Washington State University, (“WSU”), has found that the US is unlikely to realise its 2030 target for Sustainable Aviation Fuel, (“SAF”). Even under an optimistic assessment, the US is likely to produce 2.1 billion gallons of SAF, which falls short of the federal goal of 3 billion gallons per year by 2030. The domestic production is expanding, but will nevertheless be insufficient to meet the target without additional support and investment.

SAF facilitates the reduction of carbon emissions in the aviation industry. Although planes using SAF will burn an equivalent amount of carbon dioxide compared to those using normal jet fuel, the net carbon emission is lower in the former by virtue of SAF’s production process. Depending on the method of production, SAF has the capacity to reduce lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions by around 80 per cent. The most prominent form of SAF, as per the study, is Hydroprocessed Esters and Fatty Acids (“HEFA”), which are produced from oils and greases, such as cooking oil.

Unlike cars, which can be electrified, long-haul commercial flights cannot adopt such technology due to additional costs and/or technological incapacity. SAF is currently the most suitable means to reduce emissions since it requires minimal additional infrastructure. SAF can be blended with normal jet fuel.

The WSU-led study reviewed the relevant publicly announced projects in the US. One of the primary hurdles highlighted by the study is the non-implementation of projects; projects are announced, but not always carried out. To this effect, the study discusses the ‘implementation ratio’ to evaluate the ratio of projects which are announced versus those that are actually realised. Only about half of the announcements have led to operational facilities until now.

There are various reasons behind this announcement and implementation gap. One reason is the shortage of raw material to produce HEFA, i.e. used cooking oil. The demand for cooking oil has surpassed the present supply. A second connected reason is the commercial viability of SAF. Even if cooking oil is available to produce SAF, it might be more economical and commercially attractive for producers to use it to produce renewable diesel for cars, which is more profitable in light of the US policies and the current market given the Middle East conflict.

In the UK, the SAF target was missed in 2025. The mandatory target was for SAF to account for 2 per cent of the aviation fuel supply, but only 1.6 per cent was actually SAF. Although these figures are provisional, as per the Department for Transport. The target is 10 per cent by 2030 which now looks highly optimistic unless government action is taken.

© Lawrence Power 2026

Sources:

[1] Study Finds SAF Could Fall Short of 2030 Target (26 May 2026, AVWeb) <https://avweb.com/ownership/fuel-news/study-finds-saf-short-of-targets/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=rasa_io&utm_campaign=newsletter>

[2] What’s the Future of Sustainable Aviation Fuel? Here’s a Realistic Look… (27 May 2026, Michigan Farm News) <https://www.michiganfarmnews.com/what-s-the-future-of-sustainable-aviation-fuel-here-s-a-realistic-look->

[3] Sustainable Aviation Fuel Likely to Miss 2030 US Target (27 May 2026, Earth.com) <https://www.earth.com/news/sustainable-aviation-fuel-likely-to-miss-2030-u-s-target/>

[4] WSU Study Offers Realistic Look at the Future of Sustainable Aviation Fuel (26 May 2026, WSU Insider) <https://news.wsu.edu/press-release/2026/05/26/wsu-study-offers-realistic-look-at-the-future-of-sustainable-aviation-fuel/>

[5] Sustainable Aviation Fuel Take-up in UK Unlikely to Hit 2025 Target, Data Suggests (26 December 2025, The Guardian) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/dec/26/sustainable-aviation-fuel-mandate-uk-government-data-2025?CMP=share_btn_url>

[6] Pragmatic Assessment of Meeting the 2030 US Sustainable Aviation Fuel Goal (Biomass and Bioenergy 2026) <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2025.108516>

The Rising Cost of Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has transformed the technology sector at a remarkable speed over the past few years. What once appeared to be an experimental innovation, has quickly evolved into a mainstream tool used across almost every part of society.

From students and freelancers to professional services firms, AI has become embedded in everyday workflows, often faster than the broader public debate about its long-term consequences has been able to keep pace.

The appeal of AI is obvious. With tools like ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, GitHub Copilot and many more such tools, tasks that would once have required hours of human effort can now be completed in seconds and minutes. AI systems are remarkably efficient at drafting documents, creating presentations, analysing data and automating tedious administrative tasks. Although this has driven lower operational costs and higher productivity for organisations, this quick uptake of AI has also raised serious concerns. More and more people are finding themselves without employment.[i] Why? Because organisations may view the use of AI as cheaper than paying the full salary of an individual, or so it seemed at first.

Over the past few months, AI businesses have been providing consumers with access to increasingly powerful AI tools at remarkably low costs. Advanced services have been made available to users for as little as $20 a month.[ii] These premium tools now do far more than generate basic text responses. With the help of AI agents that can perform complicated and time-consuming tasks, the advanced versions can now create apps from prompts, edit and design websites, automate workflows and even generate high-resolution images.

However, the period of cheap, flat-rate AI subscriptions may not be sustainable according to the recent developments.[iii] As reported by PCWorld, Microsoft-owned GitHub appears to be one of the first major AI providers to publicly abandon flat-rate subscription models. In response to growing concerns about the true cost of advanced AI services, the company is reportedly moving its Copilot AI offerings toward more costly usage-based pricing structures.[iv] The main issue is that large amounts of processing power are required for more powerful and sophisticated AI systems. Traditional AI chat features are relatively modest in comparison with the capabilities now being offered by newer tools. These systems are no longer limited to producing basic text outputs or responding to prompts; they are increasingly capable of generating software, carrying out multi-steps tasks, providing accurate advice and editing documents with little to no human supervision.[v] These functions have drastically raised operating costs and put significantly greater strain on the computing infrastructure. As a result, there is a gap between user expectations and economic reality when such services are offered at low fixed rates.

While AI service providers continue to bear the enormous infrastructure costs necessary to maintain those systems[vi], consumers have grown accustomed to having access to remarkably powerful AI capabilities at comparatively low prices. Anthropic, the company behind Claude AI, has mentioned that the purpose of its tools was primarily conversational and that certain newer functions were never intended to be supported by its current subscription models. It is reportedly experimenting with removing Claude Code from its Pro plan and adjusting Pro and Max users’ use limiting in an effort to discover a combination that makes those plans financially viable.

With these ongoing rises in subscription prices, it is hard to imagine that ChatGPT Plus and Pro will not eventually follow suit, even though OpenAI has so far signalled confidence in maintaining its flat-rate plans.[vii]

Ultimately, the market may be approaching a pricing correction. The true cost of advanced AI is likely to become clearer as providers seek business models that reflect the computational and infrastructure demands of these tools. What users currently access for $20 or $100 per month may, in time, cost significantly more particularly for business and enterprise users. Rather than signalling the end of AI’s appeal, this shift may simply mark the end of artificial cheap access to increasingly sophisticated technology. The magic of AI maybe fading…….

© Lawrence Power 2026

[i] Trade Arabia (2026) ‘AI “proving more expensive than human workers”, 10 May 2026. Available at https://www.tradearabia.com/News/462306/AI-‘proving-more-expensive-than-human-workers’-

[ii] Patterson B. (2026) ‘The $20 AI subscription era has become untenable’,  PCWorld 01 May 2026. Available at https://www.pcworld.com/article/3129267/the-20-ai-subscription-era-has-become-untenable.html

[iii] Patterson B (2026) ‘GitHub Copilot’s price shakeup could signal the end of cheap AI coding’, PCWorld 27 April 2026. Available at https://www.pcworld.com/article/3125621/github-copilots-price-shakeup-could-signal-the-end-of-cheap-ai-coding.html

[iv] Patterson B. (2026) ‘The $20 AI subscription era has become untenable’,  PCWorld 01 May 2026. Available at https://www.pcworld.com/article/3129267/the-20-ai-subscription-era-has-become-untenable.html

[v] The Economic Times (2026) ‘Replacing humans with AI is turning out to be costlier than expected, Uber, Nvidia execs say’, 08 May 2026. Available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/work/replacing-humans-with-ai-is-turning-out-to-be-costlier-than-expected-uber-nvidia-execs-say/articleshow/130952035.cms?from=mdr

[vi] The Guardian (2026) ‘AI costs are coming to consumers’, 05 May 2026. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/global/2026/may/04/ai-costs-are-coming-to-consumers

[vii] Patterson B. (2026) ‘The $20 AI subscription era has become untenable’,  PCWorld 01 May 2026. Available at https://www.pcworld.com/article/3129267/the-20-ai-subscription-era-has-become-untenable.html

To Practice Law – What Now is Proper Supervision?

For a brief moment, it looked as though a huge part of everyday legal practice might suddenly become unlawful. That was the unsettling effect of the initial High Court’s decision in Mazur: a judgment which, called into question whether paralegals, trainees and legal executives could continue doing the work they have always done, issuing claims, progressing cases, and handling the mechanics of litigation, even under supervision.

The Court of Appeal’s recent decision in CILEX v Mazur has now restored a measure of stability, but it does more than simply reverse the earlier ruling. It offers a clearer articulation of how the law understands the conduct of litigation, and in doing so, brings it back into alignment with the realities of modern legal practice. At the centre of the case was the meaning of “carrying on the conduct of litigation” as set out in the Legal Services Act 2007. The High Court approached that question by focusing closely on who performed particular tasks. The Court of Appeal reframed the issue. As it explained, “the words conduct of litigation refer to the tasks to be undertaken, whilst the words carry on refer to direction and control of, and responsibility for, those tasks.”

That distinction proves decisive. It shifts the emphasis away from the mechanics of legal work and towards responsibility for it. On that basis, the Court rejected the idea that unauthorised individuals are limited to a purely supportive role, holding that the distinction between assisting and conducting litigation under supervision was not correct. Instead, it confirmed that unauthorised persons may carry out tasks which fall within the conduct of litigation, provided they do so on behalf of an authorised individual who retains responsibility. In the Court’s words, “it is not unlawful for an unauthorised person to act for and on behalf of an authorised individual so as to conduct litigation under their supervision,” so long as appropriate arrangements are in place.

The significance of that conclusion lies in its recognition of how legal services are actually delivered. Delegation is not a marginal feature of practice, but a central one. The Court acknowledged this directly, describing it as “a widespread and well-regulated practice.” Across law firms, in-house teams and advice organisations, litigation is conducted through structured teams in which work is distributed across individuals with varying levels of qualification and experience. To characterise that model as unlawful would not only have been disruptive, but difficult to reconcile with the broader objectives of the statutory framework.

The decision also carries broader implications for the composition of the profession. The modern legal landscape is no longer defined solely by the traditional solicitor pathway. Alternative routes, including those offered through CILEX, have expanded access to legal careers and embedded a wider range of professionals within the delivery of legal services. Much of the work undertaken by those professionals sits precisely within the space that Mazur had rendered uncertain. By restoring the legality of supervised delegation, the Court of Appeal has, in effect, affirmed a more flexible and inclusive model of legal practice.

That said, the judgment is careful to emphasise that responsibility remains firmly anchored with the authorised individual. Delegation does not dilute accountability. The authorised person must retain control of the litigation, including responsibility to the client and to the court. Yet beyond that core principle, the Court deliberately avoided prescribing detailed rules. It acknowledged that “the degree of appropriate control and supervision will always depend on the circumstances,” and declined to produce an exhaustive list of what falls within or outside the conduct of litigation.

This leaves a degree of flexibility at the margins. In many contexts, that flexibility will be both practical and necessary. However, in areas such as insolvency, where individuals may interact with non-authorised actors at an early stage and where significant decisions can be shaped before a formally authorised practitioner assumes control, the boundaries may be less clear. The Court’s emphasis on responsibility invites closer scrutiny of how, and at what point, that responsibility is meaningfully exercised in practice.

Looking ahead, the focus is likely to shift from the scope of delegation to the quality of supervision. Regulators, including the SRA, have already indicated that further guidance will be required, and firms will need to ensure that their internal structures reflect not only formal responsibility, but effective oversight. The question is no longer whether unauthorised staff can participate in litigation, that issue has now been resolved, but whether the systems within which they operate adequately support the retention of responsibility by authorised individuals.

The importance of Court of Appeal’s ruling lies in its recognition that legal practice is inherently collaborative. One way to understand what the Court of Appeal is recognising is to picture how a typical case actually moves through a modern legal team. A client’s matter might begin with a paralegal gathering documents, corresponding with the client, and preparing the first draft of a claim. A trainee or legal executive may then refine that draft, deal with procedural steps such as issuing proceedings or managing deadlines, and maintain day-to-day conduct of the file. Throughout, a supervising solicitor reviews key decisions, signs off on critical steps, and retains overall responsibility for the strategy and outcome of the case. No single individual does everything, yet the work progresses efficiently because each person contributes within a structured framework. What matters is that the supervising lawyer remains in control, not by performing every task personally, but by directing, checking and taking responsibility for the work as a whole. It is precisely this layered, collaborative model that the High Court’s decision placed under strain, and which the Court of Appeal has now, in effect, validated as both lawful and essential to the functioning of contemporary legal practice.

Ultimately, Mazur considers what the legal profession has already become. The Court of Appeal has recognised that litigation is no longer the work of a single, identifiable lawyer, but of teams operating within layered structures of responsibility. In doing so, it has preserved a system that is more efficient, more accessible, and more reflective of modern practice. But that recognition comes with a sharper challenge. If responsibility is the thread that holds this model together, it cannot be allowed to thin out as work is passed down the chain. The decision may have restored stability for now, but it also places the profession on notice: the legitimacy of this collaborative model will depend on whether supervision is real, accountability is felt, and responsibility remains more than a name attached to a file.

© Whitestone Chambers 2026

Sources:

AI and the Mentorship Gap

Before one delves into the debate of whether Artificial Intelligence, (“AI”), simplifies the job of a lawyer – or potentially replaces us – one question is crucial to ask: what, exactly, is the job of a lawyer?

Before you reach for your phone and ask ChatGPT or its AI cousins, here is our view. There are two broad skills required in the legal profession; the first is good research and the second, sound judgement/prudence.

In its current state of development, AI has a good grasp on research, especially fast research. Judgement, comes with practical experience, not simply with the ability to process vast amounts of data quickly, and thus, it is still a skill to be developed by lawyers over time. Ultimately, good research has diminished significance if not coupled with legally sound strategy.

What this implies is that ‘tech-savvy’ Gen Z, albeit excellent at grasping and using AI tools to do their work faster, (or not do it at all?), still needs mentorship on how to use AI effectively. AI may produce an output for lawyers, but one must still have the ability to discern its accuracy and relevance.

Traditionally, the role of junior lawyers would involve repetitive tasks such as proof reading, first drafts, and contract reviewing – tasks which can take hours. We can see that AI makes it possible to complete this faster paving way for junior lawyers to take up more complex work. It should be viewed as an opportunity rather than a short-cut. Reports show that using AI has led to faster and better-quality work for the majority of lawyers.

However, according to LexisNexis’ report, ‘The Mentorship Gap’, more than 70 percent of the responders believe that lawyers are struggling to develop legal reasoning and argumentation skills in the age of AI. This may be because junior level work, although repetitive, builds the requisite discipline and judgement. This does not imply that the benefits of AI must be sidelined in order for skill development; new methods must be adopted to mentor AI-equipped lawyers. Indeed, only 2 percent of the responders believe that AI improves their learning. We agree.

The speed at which AI operates would be of great assistance at a senior level, but a junior lawyer requires skills beyond mere pace. AI, especially law centric and paid models, are certainly helpful in conducting research and administrative tasks, but lawyers still need to be mentored with respect to novel skills such as verification and source checking the outputs produced. Reports thus conclude that AI should be seen as a ‘thinking partner’.

For an aspiring advocate, using AI to stress-test arguments and find potential counterpoints before court, could be valuable without undermining skill development. Technological literacy, attention to detail and drafting effective prompts for AI tools are skills which will become increasingly important with time. Ironically, AI has also led to so called ‘reverse mentorship’ where junior employees are helping their seniors upskill in AI.

Ultimately, AI is not a replacement for research and legal judgement, it is better seen as a means of building those skills earlier in your career as a lawyer. The legal profession does not simply constitute sitting behind a screen and going through documents; a major part of it is client-facing and/or court-facing. Some skills are still built through experience, mentoring and good old human intelligence!

© Lawrence Power 2026

Sources:

https://www.benefitnews.com/news/ai-is-accelerating-the-reverse-mentorship-trend

https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/blog/future-of-law/closing-the-mentorship-gap-at-the-bar-ai-as-a-thinking-partner-not-just-a-shortcut

https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/pressroom/b/news/posts/ai-is-speeding-up-junior-lawyers-work-but-raising-questions-about-how-judgment-is-learned

https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/insights/the-mentorship-gap/index.html

https://www.legalcheek.com/2026/02/research-suggests-ai-is-impacting-junior-lawyers-judgement/

America’s Hottest March on Record: Anomaly or Warning?

March 2026 was not merely warmer than usual; it was historically and decisively so. Across the United States, temperatures did not just edge past previous records, they surpassed them by a margin so wide that it demands closer scrutiny. For the first time in recorded history, a single month exceeded the long-term average by more than 9 degrees Fahrenheit. That is not fluctuation. It is a signal. So the question becomes: when a record is broken so completely, is it still a record or is it evidence of a system that has fundamentally changed?

The data is striking. The previous benchmark for the warmest March, set in 2012, was eclipsed with ease. Ten states, including Arizona, California, Texas, and Colorado, recorded their hottest March on record. The American Southwest endured more than twelve days of record-shattering heat. Nationwide, nearly 19,800 daily temperature records were broken. Numbers of this scale do not suggest randomness, but acceleration. 

Yet temperature alone does not tell the full story. March was not only the warmest on record, it was also part of the driest January-through-March period observed in the contiguous United States since records began. Nearly 60 percent of the country is now experiencing drought conditions. The combination of heat and drought strain ecosystems, destabilize agriculture, and place extraordinary pressure on already fragile water systems. 

Consider Nebraska, where worsening drought conditions contributed to the largest wildfire in the state’s history: the Morrill Fire, which scorched more than 640,000 acres. Or perhaps take Florida, now enduring its worst drought in a quarter century, prompting water restrictions and heightening wildfire risk. These are manifestations of a broader pattern where extreme heat is intensifying existing vulnerabilities. 

This is most evident in the American West. The Colorado River, a critical water source for more than 40 million people across seven states, continues to face mounting stress. Reservoirs within the basin remain well below average levels. Lake Powell, the second-largest reservoir in the United States has already dropped more than ten feet this year alone, with projections indicating further decline in the months ahead.

This begs the question of what happens when a system designed for historical norms is confronted with conditions it was never built to withstand? Climate science offers an unsettling answer. According to the Fifth National Climate Assessment, human-driven climate change is increasing both the frequency and intensity of extreme heat events. Seasonal patterns are shifting, whereby winters are becoming shorter and milder while spring warmth is arriving earlier. Six of the ten most abnormally warm months in U.S. history have occurred within the past decade. The twelve-month period from April 2025 through March 2026 stands as the warmest on record for the continental United States. 

And yet, even as these records are being set, not only are the trends indicating a changing baseline, further escalation may already be underway. Forecasters are now closely monitoring the anticipated emergence of an El Niño event later this year, suggesting it could reach unusual strength. El Niño, a natural warming of Pacific Ocean surface temperatures, has long been known to elevate global temperatures. But in a world already warmed by greenhouse gas emissions, its effects may be amplified. 

Some scientists warn that a strong El Niño could push global temperatures to new heights into late 2026 and beyond. Others point to the possibility of longer-term shifts in climate patterns following particularly intense events; what was once considered temporary may, in effect, become the new normal.

This is where the distinction of weather and climate is important to establish. Weather is immediate, while climate is cumulative. A single hot month can be dismissed. A pattern of increasingly extreme months, occurring with greater frequency and intensity, cannot.

The implications extend well beyond temperature records. Water availability, agricultural stability, energy demand and disaster preparedness are influenced by these shifts. Legal and regulatory frameworks, many of which are grounded in historical data, may face increasing strain. 

Perhaps the most pressing question is not whether records will continue to be broken; the trajectory suggests they will. The more difficult question is how societies, institutions, and systems will respond when extremes cease to be exceptional. For now, the evidence points in a clear direction: the climate is changing and it is doing so at a pace that is no longer easy to ignore.

© Lawrence Power   2026

Sources

‘The US just had its warmest March ever, by a historic margin’, ABC News, 8 April 2026:

https://abcnews.com/US/us-hottest-march-historic-margin/story?id=131846633

‘Last month was hottest March on record for continental U.S.- by most for any month ever, federal data shows’, CBS News, 9 April 2026:

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/march-hottest-month-continental-us-by-most-for-any-month-eve r-climate-change/

‘Warming Temperatures Pave the Way for El Niño’s Summer Return’, US News, 9 April 2026: https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2026-04-09/report-near-record-ocean-tem peratures-in-march-set-stage-for-el-nino 

From Vindication to Exposure: Why the Gerry Adams Claim Collapsed

The recent discontinuance of civil proceedings against Gerry Adams in the High Court illustrates how procedural rules can shape litigation as decisively as statute or evidence. This is especially true in relation to costs, where a late-stage shift in risk can determine the outcome of a case regardless of its substantive merits.

Background of the case

The claimants were victims of IRA bombings, including the 1973 Old Bailey attack and later incidents in London Docklands and Manchester. Each sought nominal damages of £1, framing the case as a vindicatory exercise rather than a conventional claim for compensation.

Gerry Adams, former leader of Sinn Féin, has long denied IRA membership. The claimants alleged he bore personal responsibility for the attacks. The case proceeded to a two-week trial before Mr Justice Swift. Adams gave evidence over two days and was challenged on decades of material, including government documents and political statements. Counsel for Adams argued the claim rested on an “assortment of hearsay” and had been brought “several decades too late”.

Against that backdrop, the breadth of the evidence and the claimants’ aim of establishing responsibility for Troubles-era events raised a more fundamental procedural issue beyond a conventional civil claim.

Abuse of Process

It was in this context that the court intervened to consider whether the claim might amount to an abuse of process. Abuse of process is any use of litigation in a way that is “significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process” The concern was not simply about the strength of the evidence, but about the function the proceedings were being asked to serve. Civil litigation is designed to determine defined disputes between parties on the basis of legally admissible evidence. It is not ordinarily a vehicle for a “collateral purpose” such as resolving broad questions of historical or political accountability.

By relying on extensive hearsay, historic allegations, and material not easily tested in the ordinary way, the claim risked inviting the court to conduct what was, in substance, a quasi-public inquiry into the Troubles. Although no final ruling on abuse of process was made, the judge’s decision to raise the issue at such a late stage fundamentally altered the nature of the litigation. What had been a question of liability became a question of whether the claim should have been brought at all – leading to potential costs implications for the claimants.

Costs Protection and the Risk of Adverse Costs

The claimants benefited from costs protection, most likely through qualified one-way costs shifting (QOCS), alongside any litigation funding arrangements in place. QOCS applies to claims for damages arising out of personal injury or death and operates to limit a claimant’s exposure to adverse costs. In practical terms, this means that, even if the claim fails, a defendant’s costs order is not enforceable beyond any damages recovered by the claimant. Here, where only nominal damages of £1 were sought, that protection would in effect operate as a near-complete shield against adverse costs liability.

However, that protection is not absolute. It can be disapplied where proceedings are struck out as an abuse of process. In such circumstances, the claimant loses the benefit of QOCS entirely, and any costs order becomes fully enforceable. If the court were to conclude that the proceedings constituted a misuse of its process, the claimants would therefore be exposed to the defendant’s costs in full.

As the claimants’ solicitors explained, the trial judge’s decision to raise this issue created “a real risk that the claimants… could face devastating personal liability for legal costs”. They added that the claimants had “no realistic choice” but to discontinue, given they were “faced with even a small risk of life-changing financial consequences”.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the case is a reminder that litigation is as much about risk management as it is about legal merits. Even a strongly motivated claim can become untenable if the cost position shifts. Here, once the possibility of losing costs protection arose, the position changed entirely. What began as a vindicatory claim became a question of exposure. Litigation strategy must be kept under constant review, not just considering the evidence, but in light of the evolving costs risk. Decisions to continue or discontinue are often driven less by the strength of the case than by the potential consequences of an adverse ruling.

© Whitestone Chambers 2026

Sources

Original BBC Article: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cyv1p930gq4o

“Ordinary and proper use of the court process:” https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2000/453.html&query=(Attorney)+AND+(General)+AND+(v)+AND+(Barker) at paragraph 19.

“Collateral Purpose” https://www.forbessolicitors.co.uk/articles/abuse-of-process-and-striking-out

CPR Part 44: https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part-44-general-rules-about-costs#rule44.14

A Legal Reset for AI Patents; The Turning Point for the AI and Software Patents Race in the UK

The boundaries of patent law are once again being tested by artificial intelligence. In a recent decision, the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) refused a patent application from AI music company DAACI for a system designed to automatically generate music based on an emotional brief. Despite the system’s ability to produce compositions with “audibly correct form,” the office concluded that the invention amounted to nothing more than a “program for a computer”, a category long excluded from patent protection under UK law.

The ruling highlights a growing legal tension: as generative AI systems increasingly blur the line between technical innovation and creative output, patent law is being forced to decide where software ends and invention begins.

At the centre of the dispute was a patent application filed by DAACI in March 2021 for a system designed to automatically generate musical compositions. The invention, described in patent GB 2605440A, aimed to create music that responds to an “emotional brief” provided by a user. In practice, the system would interpret narrative or emotional cues, such as tension, excitement, or melancholy and generate a composition intended to reflect those moods while maintaining what the company described as an “audibly correct form.”

The very nature of the invention; an AI system designed to automate the creative process, would become central to the legal challenge that followed. When the application came before the UK IPO, the key question was not whether the system could generate convincing music, but whether the underlying innovation amounted to a technical invention at all.

In assessing DAACI’s application, the UK IPO relied on the long-standing Aerotel framework for determining whether an invention falls within excluded subject matter such as a “computer program as such.” Under that approach, decision-makers first identify the invention’s contribution and then assess whether that contribution is technical in nature. Applying this reasoning, the hearing officer accepted that DAACI’s system contributed something new by automating musical composition in response to emotional prompts. However, he concluded that the problem being solved, producing aesthetically meaningful music, was ultimately creative rather than technical, meaning the invention remained within the exclusion.

However, just days after the DAACI decision was handed down, the Supreme Court ruled in Emotional Perception AI Ltd v Comptroller General of Patents that the Aerotel test should no longer be followed. Instead, UK law must align with the approach of the European Patent Office (EPO), particularly the Enlarged Board of Appeal’s decision in G1/19.

Under the new approach followed by the EPO, the first hurdle is relatively easy to clear. If an invention involves some form of technical system, such as software running on hardware, it will usually count as an “invention” in principle. But that does not mean it will receive a patent. The real test comes next, when examiners look closely at the invention’s features and ask a tougher question: which parts of this system actually represent a technical improvement? Only those technical elements are considered when deciding whether the invention is truly new and inventive compared to what already exists. This matters because, as AI systems become more sophisticated, whether an invention passes this test could determine which companies can claim ownership of the underlying technology, and ultimately shape who leads the next generation of AI-driven creativity.

Viewed through this updated lens, the reasoning in DAACI appears somewhat out of step with the direction of UK patent law. The new framework would focus more narrowly on whether the claimed system involved technical means and which elements of it possess genuine technical character. For AI-driven systems operating at the intersection of software and creativity, that shift could prove decisive.

The timing of the DAACI decision makes this tension particularly striking. The removal of the old Aerotel framework and the shift toward the EPO’s approach may make it easier for AI inventions to pass the first hurdle of patent eligibility. But that does not mean patents for generative AI will suddenly become commonplace. Instead, the battleground is likely to move deeper into the analysis, where companies must show that the technical machinery behind the AI, its architecture, training processes, or data processing methods, represents a genuine technological advance.

This shift could also change how AI developers approach patent strategy. Rather than emphasising the creative results produced by their systems, companies may increasingly frame their inventions around the technical processes that enable those results, for example; the way an algorithm processes input data, structures musical elements, or optimises the generation of compositions. In other words, the legal focus may move away from the music itself and toward the technical infrastructure that allows machines to create it.

If patents do begin to emerge around these kinds of AI systems, the effects could be far-reaching. AI models and training techniques could become some of the most valuable intellectual property in the technology sector, attracting investment but also raising the stakes in an already intense race to develop more powerful systems. At the same time, stronger patent protection could reshape competition, potentially allowing early movers to lock up key technological building blocks.

Ultimately, cases like DAACI reveal how uneasy the relationship between creativity and patent law has become. AI may be capable of composing music at the touch of a button, but the law still insists on asking the harder question: is the invention behind it is truly technical? And as AI grows more capable, that question is only going to get harder.

© Lawrence Power 2026

Bibliography:

Late Notice to Prove and Relief from Sanctions: Invest Bank v El-Husseini

The Commercial Court decision in Invest Bank PSC v El-Husseini & Ors [2024] EWHC 1804 (Comm) provides a useful reminder of the strict procedural consequences that can follow from failing to comply with the rules governing notices to prove documents. The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Calver, arose during the course of a four-week Commercial Court trial and concerned an application by the claimant bank for relief from sanctions.

The underlying proceedings were brought under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986. This provision allows the court to set aside transactions entered into at an undervalue where the purpose of the transaction was to prejudice the interests of creditors. The Bank alleged that certain transactions involving members of the El-Husseini family and associated parties had been structured with that objective in mind. The issue arose on day six of the trial and concerned a Divorce Agreement disclosed by the Sixth Defendant. The Bank wished to challenge the date on which the agreement had been executed.

The Notice to Prove

Under Civil Procedure Rules r.32.19, a party is deemed to admit the authenticity of a document disclosed to it unless it serves notice requiring the document to be proved at trial. The notice must be served by the latest date for serving witness statements or within seven days of disclosure, whichever is later. In this case, the deadline for witness statements was 1 March 2024. The Bank did not serve a notice to prove by that date. Instead, it served one on 14 March 2024 seeking to challenge the date of execution recorded on the Divorce Agreement.

The Bank argued that the notice was nevertheless valid because the court had later ordered the service of supplemental witness statements by 17 June 2024. On that basis, it contended that the “latest date for serving witness statements” within CPR 32.19 included the later deadline for supplemental statements.

Calver J rejected that argument. Although he observed that CPR 32.19 is “poorly worded”, he held that the rule refers to the deadline for primary witness statements rather than any later supplemental statements. If the Bank’s interpretation were correct, parties could remain uncertain about whether documents might be challenged at a much later stage in the litigation. This would undermine the purpose of the rule, which is to give the party relying on the document sufficient time to gather evidence proving its authenticity. The consequence was that the Bank had been deemed to admit the authenticity of the Divorce Agreement once the 1 March deadline passed.

Relief from Sanctions

The Bank therefore required relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9. The court approached the issue using the familiar three stage framework established in Denton v TH White Ltd., concluding that the breach was both serious and significant. Although the notice had been served only two weeks late, the Bank waited almost three months before applying for relief. The issue ultimately had to be addressed during the trial itself, requiring the court to interrupt the hearing to determine the application.

The Forgery Issue

Ultimately, the decisive factor was that granting relief would serve no useful purpose. The Bank’s objective in serving the notice to prove was to challenge the date on which the Divorce Agreement had been executed. As the court explained, alleging that a document was not executed on the date appearing on its face amounts, in law, to an allegation of forgery.

Relying on the Court of Appeal decision in Eco 3 Capital Ltd v Ludsin Overseas Ltd, the judge held that such an allegation must be clearly pleaded. A party cannot avoid pleading forgery by simply requiring the opposing party to prove the document’s authenticity. The Bank had not pleaded forgery and accepted that it could not do so. Allowing the notice to prove would therefore permit what the authorities describe as a covert and unpleaded case of forgery. In those circumstances the application could achieve nothing of practical value.

The Bank’s application for relief from sanctions was accordingly refused and dismissed with costs.

Significance

The decision highlights two practical points for litigators.

First, it clarifies that the “latest date for serving witness statements” in CPR 32.19 refers to the deadline for primary witness statements, not any later deadline for supplemental statements. Parties should therefore ensure that notices to prove are served by the original witness statement deadline.

Secondly, the judgment demonstrates the limits of challenging the authenticity of documents without properly articulating the case being advanced. Where the substance of the challenge amounts to an allegation of forgery, that allegation must be clearly pleaded.

The Invest Bank PSC case serves as a reminder that even relatively minor procedural oversights can have significant consequences on the potential outcome of a trial, particularly once it is already underway.

© Whitestone Chambers 2026

Sources:

Invest Bank Judgment: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2024/1804.html

Denton v TH White ltd. https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/906.html

Eco 3 Judgment: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/413.html

NTSB Finds Systemic Failures Behind Deadly Washington D.C. Midair Collision 

I return to aviation and I recall my work regarding the Shoreham Air Disaster.

It is nearly one year after a fatal midair collision over the Potomac River, Washington DC – the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, (NTSB), has concluded that the crash on January 29 2025  between an American Airlines regional jet and a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter was the result of systemic regulatory and operational failures, not isolated human error. 

The collision, which occurred near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), killed all 67 people aboard both aircraft, making it the deadliest U.S. commercial aviation accident in more than two decades. 

The Probable Cause

In its final public board meeting, the NTSB sharply criticised the Federal Aviation Administration, (FAA), for placing helicopter routes in dangerous proximity to active runway approach paths without adequate procedural safeguards. The Board formally adopted a probable cause finding that faulted the FAA for multiple issues:

  • designing helicopter routes with minimal vertical separation from landing aircraft,
  • failing to regularly review and evaluate helicopter traffic data,
  • ignoring years of near collision data and
  • internal warnings and failing to act on prior safety recommendations aimed at mitigating midair collision risk at DCA. 

According to NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy, the FAA possessed data showing more than 15,000 close proximity events, including 85 serious incidents over a number of years, yet failed to meaningfully analyse or act upon it. Investigators identified an average of 18 close calls per year between helicopters and airplanes operating near the airport. 

The Visual Separation

The Board also identified an over reliance on pilot applied ‘visual separation’, which was particularly problematic in congested, night time airspace such as DCA. Investigators concluded that this reliance introduced risk because of cockpit blind spots, background city lighting and the limitations of human perception. 

Recreated flight simulations showed how the commercial jet blended into Washington’s night lights from the helicopter cockpit, while cockpit structure and aircraft geometry significantly limited what the airline pilots could see. The NTSB found it would have been extremely difficult for the jet’s crew to visually detect or avoid the helicopter in time. 

The Air Traffic Control

Although the NTSB determined that staffing levels alone did not cause the crash, it is not surprising that investigators highlighted controller workload and combined control positions as contributing factors. At the time of the collision, a single controller was communicating with six airplanes and five helicopters. 

Crucially, the FAA acknowledged that the control tower failed to warn the airline pilots of nearby helicopter traffic. While the helicopter crew was instructed to pass behind the jet, a partially blocked radio transmission meant they did not hear the full instruction. Believing they had the correct aircraft in sight, a phenomenon attributed to expectation bias, the helicopter crew requested visual seperation. 

The Technology Gaps

The investigation also focused heavily on the absence of effective collision avoidance technology, including the Automatic Dependant Surveillance- Broadcast, (ADS-B), a system that transmits an aircraft’s GPS based position, altitude and speed to controllers and nearby aircraft, enabling real time collision alerts.

At the time, the Army Black Hawk was allowed to fly with ADS-B turned off and the regional jet lacked ADS-B In, which would have received alerts. Investigators concluded that, if fully equipped, both crews could have received warnings up to a minute before the collision, potentially preventing the crash.

The findings underscore calls for broader ADS-B equipage, now central to the bipartisan ROTOR Act, which would mandate the system for civil and military aircraft operating near congested airspace.    

The Altitude Discrepancies 

Investigators also identified discrepancies in the helicopter’s altitude readings. Although the published route capped helicopter altitude at 200 feet, the collision occurred at nearly 300 feet. Allowable equipment tolerances and Army altitude holding standards meant aircraft could unintentionally fly closer to commercial traffic than intended. The NTSB cited shortcomings in the Army’s safety culture, including failures to ensure pilots fully understood altimeter tolerances and route limitations.

The Legal Implications 

In December 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice formally admitted federal liability, citing the actions of both the Army helicopter crew and the FAA air traffic controller. During the NTSB hearing, board members emphasised that individual errors were set up for failure, to some extent, by the systems around them.

The Safety Recommendations 

The NTSB approved 50 new safety recommendations; the majority quite rightly directed at the FAA. These include redesigning helicopter routes near DCA, integrating helicopter route data into approach procedures, enhancing controller training and conflict alert systems, improving staffing practices and expanding and improving airborne collision avoidance systems. 

The Board also warned that similar risk hotspots may exist elsewhere, citing concerns raised by airlines about airports such as Hollywood Burbank in California. We should look for this here in the UK as well.

The Next Steps

An executive summary of the findings is expected shortly, with the full final report, approximately 500 pages, to be released in the coming weeks. While the FAA has implemented some post-crash measures, including reduced arrival rates and increased staffing at DCA, the NTSB stressed that lasting safety reform will depend on sustained regulatory action. 

© Lawrence Power 2026

Sources 

https://avweb.com/flight-safety/accidents-ntsb/ntsb-dca-midair-collision-was-preventable

https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/27/us/ntsb-plane-crash-dc-potomac?utm_medium=email&ut m_source=rasa_io&utm_campaign=newsletter

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/fatal-american-airlines-jet-army-helicopter-collision-resultmulitude-errors-2026-01-27/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

GEMA v OpenAI: A Landmark Copyright Ruling in the Age of Generative AI

The Regional Court of Munich’s November 2025 decision in GEMA v OpenAI marks a defining moment for the global conversation around copyright and AI. The court held that OpenAI’s ChatGPT had violated German copyright law by reproducing song lyrics from GEMA’s catalogue without proper licensing. In my opinion this ruling resonates far beyond Germany, signalling that in the age of generative AI, creators’ rights remain firmly protected. [i]

Background

GEMA, which represents composers, lyricists, and music publishers in Germany, brought the case over nine of the country’s best-known songs. These included Herbert Grönemeyer’s 1984 hit Männer and Helene Fischer’s Atemlos Durch die Nacht, which was the unofficial anthem of the German side during the 2014 Football World Cup. [ii]

When prompted by users, ChatGPT generated full or nearly complete versions of these copyrighted lyrics, showing that OpenAI’s system had “memorised” the works during training. OpenAI’s lawyers argued that its model did not store copyrighted text but generated new material based on statistical patterns. It also invoked the EU’s “text and data mining” (TDM) exception[iii], which allows limited use of data for machine learning. The court rejected this defence, concluding that reproducing song lyrics went beyond permissible data mining and amounted to infringement. As a result, GEMA was entitled to the claims for injunctive relief, information and damages.[iv]

Significance

This ruling should reshape how AI companies interact with creative industries. It establishes a clear precedent that “memorisation” within an AI system, where models can regenerate copyrighted works, may constitute reproduction under copyright law.

This is one of the first European judgments to hold an AI developer liable not for traditional copying, but for what its model learned and could later output. The court’s reasoning will likely influence how AI developers manage training data and licensing obligations. Developers may now need to obtain explicit permissions for copyrighted content used to train generative models, particularly music, literature, and art. The ruling may also push AI developers to disclose what data their models use, promoting transparency but also adding compliance challenges.

Interestingly, this strict interpretation contrasts with the UK’s Getty Images v Stability AI case[v]. There, the High Court found that Stability AI’s model had not infringed copyright because it learned from data statistically rather than storing it.[vi] This divergence highlights a growing legal gap between the EU and UK courts. While the UK leans toward a permissive view of machine learning, the EU appears to prioritise creators’ rights – even when innovation is at stake.

Key Takeaways

  • Memorisation equals reproduction: If an AI model can regenerate protected works, that may amount to infringement.
  • Dual exposure: Liability can arise both during training (embedding copyrighted works) and generation (reproducing them).
  • Licensing obligations: Developers should secure rights for creative data sets before training.
  • Jurisdictional divergence: Europe’s stricter approach diverges from the UK’s more flexible stance, creating compliance complexities for global developers.

Conclusion

GEMA v OpenAI [vii] underscores a pivotal shift in how courts interpret AI’s relationship with copyright. By recognising that training an AI can infringe when memorisation leads to faithful reproduction, the Munich court has drawn new lines in the sand. For AI developers, innovation must now consider alignment with established copyright principles. Whitestone will certainly working with it’s creative clients in music and the arts to look further into protecting their intellectual property rights.

© Lawrence Power 2025

[i] GEMA v OpenAI (Munich District Court I, 11 November 2025) < https://media.licdn.com/dms/document/media/v2/D4E1FAQGoTQ9DKfW1uw/feedshare-document-pdf-analyzed/B4EZp0_lp_IwAc-/0/1762899432336?e=1764201600&v=beta&t=HborRwy3RYuqCH4P0PabjE-jXUYKK7My5_vCGX7pTmg> accessed on 13 November 2025.

[ii] The Guardian, ‘ChatGPT violated copyright law by ‘learning’ from song lyrics German court rules’ , 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/nov/11/chatgpt-violated-copyright-laws-german-court-rules > accessed on 13 November 2025.

[iii] TDM, exception cite

[iv] GEMA v OpenAI (Munich District Court I, 11 November 2025) <  > accessed on 13 November 2025.

[v] Getty Images v Stability AI [2025] EWHC 2863 (Ch).

[vi] Getty Images v Stability AI [2025] EWHC 2863 (Ch) [554].

[vii] GEMA v OpenAI (Munich District Court I, 11 November 2025) <  > accessed on 13 November 2025.