Whitestone Chambers’ Mina Heung, acting for British Airways Plc in Poulten & Others v British Airways Plc, 20 July 2026, successfully challenged the right of audience of an advocacy agent appearing in a small claims flight compensation case before District Judge Atkin at Uxbridge County Court.

The Court held that the advocate had not established a legal entitlement to appear. It also found that the challenge had been properly raised and awarded British Airways its costs arising out of the adjournment and determination of the preliminary issue.

The ruling provides a timely reminder that recent clarification of the law concerning the conduct of litigation has not resolved the separate and increasingly contentious question of who is entitled to conduct advocacy in the County Court.

The position after Mazur.

In Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2026] EWCA Civ 369, the Court of Appeal addressed the reserved legal activity of conducting litigation. It held that an unauthorised person may lawfully perform litigation tasks for and on behalf of an authorised individual, provided that the authorised individual retains responsibility and appropriate arrangements exist for management, supervision and control.

Mazur was an important decision, but it did not determine the separate question of rights of audience.

The Legal Services Act 2007 identifies the conduct of litigation and the exercise of a right of audience as distinct reserved legal activities. Authority to undertake litigation work under supervision does not therefore answer whether an individual is legally entitled to address the Court as an advocate.

That distinction was central to the issue before District Judge Atkin.

The representation structure.

The underlying claim concerned UK 261 statutory compensation following the cancellation of a flight.

The passengers had instructed a firm of solicitors to conduct their claim. That firm instructed a separate advocacy provider, which in turn instructed the individual who attended the hearing.

The structure was therefore:

Passengers → solicitors on the court record → advocacy provider → individual advocate

The individual did not possess an independent right of audience. His entitlement to conduct the hearing therefore depended upon establishing that he fell within an applicable exception.

The Court considered two possible routes: Practice Direction 27A and the exempt-person provisions within Schedule 3 to the Legal Services Act 2007.

Practice Direction 27A.

Practice Direction 27A defines a “lawyer”, for the purposes of representation on the small claims track, as including a barrister, solicitor or a legal executive “employed by a solicitor”, together with those otherwise authorised to act as litigators or advocates.

The advocate was described as having been “engaged” by the advocacy provider. The Court rejected the submission that the words “employed by a solicitor” should be interpreted as extending to any individual subcontracted or commercially engaged by a legal services business.

District Judge Atkin concluded that, had the provision been intended to encompass any person retained through such an arrangement, it could have been expressed in those broader terms.

The Practice Direction did not provide a general route by which an external advocacy agent could acquire a right of audience.

The limits of Halborg.

The alternative argument relied upon Schedule 3 paragraph 1(7) of the Legal Services Act 2007 and the decision in Halborg v Apple (UK) Ltd & Another [2022] (Unreported).
Halborg has frequently been relied upon for the proposition that advocacy may amount to “assisting in the conduct of litigation”. It is, however, a persuasive County Court decision rather than binding appellate authority, and it arose from a particular factual and professional structure.

In Halborg, the firm responsible for instructing and supervising the advocate was also, through its trading style, providing the litigation services in the proceedings. The Court’s conclusions were reached in the context of that integrated arrangement.

The structure before District Judge Atkin was materially different. The solicitors conducting the claim and the separate advocacy provider were distinct entities, with the individual advocate appearing at the end of a further chain of instruction.

The Court was not satisfied that the statutory conditions had been established merely by relying upon Halborg and asserting that the advocate was supervised.
Halborg did not confer an automatic right of audience. It did not operate as a gateway through which every individual instructed by an advocacy provider could pass.

A closer comparison: Vehicle Control Services v Langley.

The Defendant relied upon Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Langley [2026] EWCC 1 as a closer factual comparison.

Langley also concerned a layered structure in which the solicitors conducting the litigation instructed a separate advocacy provider, which then subcontracted an individual to attend the hearing.

DJ Pratt distinguished that arrangement from the traditional model of a managing clerk or legal executive genuinely working under the direction of the solicitor conducting the litigation. The Court held that advocacy alone could not make the exemption self-proving and that supervision by an advocacy agency which had taken no part in the litigation did not necessarily satisfy the statutory conditions.

District Judge Atkin considered the structure in Langley to be more closely analogous to the case before her.

The Court accepted that advocacy might, in an appropriate case, form part of assisting in the conduct of litigation. The difficulty was that the existence of advocacy could not, by itself, establish all the remaining elements of the statutory exemption.

The decision.

District Judge Atkin found that the right-of-audience challenge had been correctly raised.

The Court was not satisfied that the advocate fell within the relevant definition under Practice Direction 27A. Nor was it satisfied that the requirements of Schedule 3 paragraph 1(7) had been established.

The Judge emphasised that the responsibility rests upon the person seeking to exercise a right of audience. An individual without independent advocacy rights must attend court and be able to establish the legal basis upon which they seek to appear.

The ruling was expressly fact-specific. It did not establish that no advocacy agent could ever fall within the statutory exemption. It established that the exemption cannot be presumed merely because an individual has been instructed by a solicitor or through an advocacy provider.

The Defendant was awarded its costs arising from the adjournment and of the preliminary issue.

Why the issue matters.

Rights of audience are not just a procedural formality.

An advocate appearing before the Court undertakes professional responsibilities to the Court, the client and the administration of justice. Barristers, solicitors and independently authorised advocates are subject to regulatory standards, professional discipline and insurance requirements.

The same entitlement cannot be created simply by applying a professional-sounding label or inserting a regulated firm somewhere within a chain of commercial instruction.

The point is particularly important in high-volume small claims litigation. A claimant may have instructed one business, while the individual ultimately conducting the hearing has been retained through several further layers and may have had no direct contact with the claimant.

The claimant nevertheless remains the party to the proceedings and may bear the consequences of the way the case is presented, including an adverse costs order.

Clarity about who is entitled to appear therefore protects not only the Court and the opposing party, but the litigant whose case is being conducted.

The need for authoritative guidance.

Mazur has now provided authoritative clarification concerning the delegation and supervision of litigation work. It should not, however, be treated as resolving the separate law governing advocacy.

The continuing divergence between County Court decisions such as Halborg and Langley demonstrates the need for binding appellate guidance on the application of Schedule 3 to modern advocacy-agency arrangements.

Until that guidance is available, courts are likely to continue examining these arrangements on their individual facts.

The central principle remains straightforward.

An individual without an independent right of audience does not acquire one merely because they have been instructed through solicitors or an advocacy provider.

Halborg is not a gateway. Rights of audience must be established, not assumed.

This article is based upon counsel’s contemporaneous note of an ex tempore judgment. An approved transcript is awaited.

© Mina Heung 2026