To Practice Law – What Now is Proper Supervision?

For a brief moment, it looked as though a huge part of everyday legal practice might suddenly become unlawful. That was the unsettling effect of the initial High Court’s decision in Mazur: a judgment which, called into question whether paralegals, trainees and legal executives could continue doing the work they have always done, issuing claims, progressing cases, and handling the mechanics of litigation, even under supervision.

The Court of Appeal’s recent decision in CILEX v Mazur has now restored a measure of stability, but it does more than simply reverse the earlier ruling. It offers a clearer articulation of how the law understands the conduct of litigation, and in doing so, brings it back into alignment with the realities of modern legal practice. At the centre of the case was the meaning of “carrying on the conduct of litigation” as set out in the Legal Services Act 2007. The High Court approached that question by focusing closely on who performed particular tasks. The Court of Appeal reframed the issue. As it explained, “the words conduct of litigation refer to the tasks to be undertaken, whilst the words carry on refer to direction and control of, and responsibility for, those tasks.”

That distinction proves decisive. It shifts the emphasis away from the mechanics of legal work and towards responsibility for it. On that basis, the Court rejected the idea that unauthorised individuals are limited to a purely supportive role, holding that the distinction between assisting and conducting litigation under supervision was not correct. Instead, it confirmed that unauthorised persons may carry out tasks which fall within the conduct of litigation, provided they do so on behalf of an authorised individual who retains responsibility. In the Court’s words, “it is not unlawful for an unauthorised person to act for and on behalf of an authorised individual so as to conduct litigation under their supervision,” so long as appropriate arrangements are in place.

The significance of that conclusion lies in its recognition of how legal services are actually delivered. Delegation is not a marginal feature of practice, but a central one. The Court acknowledged this directly, describing it as “a widespread and well-regulated practice.” Across law firms, in-house teams and advice organisations, litigation is conducted through structured teams in which work is distributed across individuals with varying levels of qualification and experience. To characterise that model as unlawful would not only have been disruptive, but difficult to reconcile with the broader objectives of the statutory framework.

The decision also carries broader implications for the composition of the profession. The modern legal landscape is no longer defined solely by the traditional solicitor pathway. Alternative routes, including those offered through CILEX, have expanded access to legal careers and embedded a wider range of professionals within the delivery of legal services. Much of the work undertaken by those professionals sits precisely within the space that Mazur had rendered uncertain. By restoring the legality of supervised delegation, the Court of Appeal has, in effect, affirmed a more flexible and inclusive model of legal practice.

That said, the judgment is careful to emphasise that responsibility remains firmly anchored with the authorised individual. Delegation does not dilute accountability. The authorised person must retain control of the litigation, including responsibility to the client and to the court. Yet beyond that core principle, the Court deliberately avoided prescribing detailed rules. It acknowledged that “the degree of appropriate control and supervision will always depend on the circumstances,” and declined to produce an exhaustive list of what falls within or outside the conduct of litigation.

This leaves a degree of flexibility at the margins. In many contexts, that flexibility will be both practical and necessary. However, in areas such as insolvency, where individuals may interact with non-authorised actors at an early stage and where significant decisions can be shaped before a formally authorised practitioner assumes control, the boundaries may be less clear. The Court’s emphasis on responsibility invites closer scrutiny of how, and at what point, that responsibility is meaningfully exercised in practice.

Looking ahead, the focus is likely to shift from the scope of delegation to the quality of supervision. Regulators, including the SRA, have already indicated that further guidance will be required, and firms will need to ensure that their internal structures reflect not only formal responsibility, but effective oversight. The question is no longer whether unauthorised staff can participate in litigation, that issue has now been resolved, but whether the systems within which they operate adequately support the retention of responsibility by authorised individuals.

The importance of Court of Appeal’s ruling lies in its recognition that legal practice is inherently collaborative. One way to understand what the Court of Appeal is recognising is to picture how a typical case actually moves through a modern legal team. A client’s matter might begin with a paralegal gathering documents, corresponding with the client, and preparing the first draft of a claim. A trainee or legal executive may then refine that draft, deal with procedural steps such as issuing proceedings or managing deadlines, and maintain day-to-day conduct of the file. Throughout, a supervising solicitor reviews key decisions, signs off on critical steps, and retains overall responsibility for the strategy and outcome of the case. No single individual does everything, yet the work progresses efficiently because each person contributes within a structured framework. What matters is that the supervising lawyer remains in control, not by performing every task personally, but by directing, checking and taking responsibility for the work as a whole. It is precisely this layered, collaborative model that the High Court’s decision placed under strain, and which the Court of Appeal has now, in effect, validated as both lawful and essential to the functioning of contemporary legal practice.

Ultimately, Mazur considers what the legal profession has already become. The Court of Appeal has recognised that litigation is no longer the work of a single, identifiable lawyer, but of teams operating within layered structures of responsibility. In doing so, it has preserved a system that is more efficient, more accessible, and more reflective of modern practice. But that recognition comes with a sharper challenge. If responsibility is the thread that holds this model together, it cannot be allowed to thin out as work is passed down the chain. The decision may have restored stability for now, but it also places the profession on notice: the legitimacy of this collaborative model will depend on whether supervision is real, accountability is felt, and responsibility remains more than a name attached to a file.

© Whitestone Chambers 2026

Sources:

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *